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The world economy moved sharply into recession over the second half of 2008. Every G7
economy experienced a fall in output in the second half of last year, continuing into early 2009,
and many other economies across the world also experienced a contraction in economic activity.
The driving force behind the downturn is the global ￿nancial crisis which brought to an end the
worldwide credit boom that began in the mid-1990s.
Previous global bank lending booms in the early 1970s and mid-to-late 1980s were hump-shaped
phenomena lasting between two and ￿ve years. The boom which started in the mid-1990s and
ended only recently was different. It lasted twice as long, the increase in the bank lending to
GDP ratio was more marked, and it was concentrated in the household sector in its later stages to
an unusual extent. It also seems to have been focused on the advanced economies and US-led,
with the boom in the US starting in the mid-1990s compared with start dates of 2001-2002 for
most other economies. There was also a rapid expansion in the shadow banking and broader
￿nancial systems although, importantly, this was part of a trend which can be traced back to the
early 1980s.
Associated with the rapid expansion of credit were a number of other macroeconomic
phenomena. Many have featured regularly in previous cross-country empirical work. Real short-
and long-term interest rates declined; there was a rapid increase in equity prices in its ￿rst phase
and in property prices throughout; and in the advanced economies where the boom was
concentrated real exchange rates rose and current account balances fell. However, somewhat
paradoxically, it appears that output and in￿ation were generally stable in the advanced
economies where the credit expansion was concentrated and increased in the emerging
economies where it was not.
The coexistence of broadly stable growth and in￿ation and a long-lasting credit and ￿nancial
cycle challenges the macroeconomic consensus. The assumptions of the prevailing Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium model ￿ ef￿cient markets, rational expectations and optimising
agents ￿ are hard to reconcile with these empirical features. And while elements of alternative
Monetarist, Austrian, Post Keynesian and Behavioural thinking provide some insights into the
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 27 June 2009 3origins of credit and ￿nancial cycles they do not account for the credit boom’s unusual duration
or the absence of strengthening output growth and rising in￿ation in the advanced economies.
We show how the origins of the credit and ￿nancial cycle are connected with three
macroeconomic features of this period: the emergence of signi￿cant global ￿nancial imbalances;
the previous experience of steady growth and in￿ation in many advanced economies since the
1980s (known as the Great Stability or Great Moderation); and a new phase of globalisation of
the world economy which saw the integration of China and many other low cost producers into
the global economic system. We show that, while the ￿global savings glut￿ may have been an
important driver of the credit boom in the late 1990s, other factors ￿ such the conduct of
monetary policy and perceptions of declining macroeconomic risk ￿ were more important from
the mid-2000s onwards.
We also propose two explanations for the ￿growth puzzle of the 2000s￿ ￿ i.e., the coexistence of
broadly stable growth and in￿ation and a long-lasting credit and ￿nancial cycle. First, the rise in
credit and asset prices seems to have been driven by factors that had a relatively limited impact
on demand and which generated relatively mild wealth effects on demand. Second, in those
economies where demand did increase it did not translate into much higher output because a
large portion spilled over into imports and deteriorating external balances. These demand
spillovers were consequently re￿ected in strong export and output growth and the build up of
external surpluses in Japan, Germany, China and other emerging market economies. So, while
output growth was not particularly strong in the major advanced economies in the mid-2000s,
this was still a period of strong growth in emerging markets and globally which led to upward
pressure on energy and commodity prices.
This analysis suggests that there is plenty of scope for improving both macroeconomics and
policy. We therefore conclude by identifying some of the challenges facing both. We discuss the
need to: integrate endogenous credit and ￿nancial cycles into orthodox macroeconomic models;
improve understanding of macro-￿nancial linkages; recognise the limitations of economic
theory; develop tools for macro-prudential regulation; and be realistic about the degree of
macroeconomic stability that national monetary policy can achieve in a highly integrated global
economy.
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The world economy moved sharply into recession over the second half of 2008, and so far it is
not clear how deep or prolonged this recession will be. Every G7 economy experienced a fall in
output in the second half of last year, continuing into early 2009, and many other economies
across the world also experienced a contraction in economic activity.
The main driving force behind the downturn has been the global ￿nancial crisis originating from
losses in the sub-prime US mortgage market and the associated shock to consumer and business
con￿dence which followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The global ￿nancial crisis also
brought to an end a long period of rapid credit growth which fuelled rising asset prices, in
particular of property. The clear association between the ￿nancial crisis and the onset of
recession has put the spotlight on the rapid expansion of credit which preceded both.
In most major economies, the conventional macroeconomic indicators used to guide
macroeconomic policy ￿ output and in￿ation ￿ did not suggest that trouble was ahead. Indeed,
when the crisis hit in 2007, the prevailing view of the period of economic expansion going back
to the late 1980s and early 1990s was that it was a ￿Great Stability￿ or ￿Great Moderation￿ ￿ a
period of steady and sustained growth accompanied by low in￿ation. As a result, although there
was concern over the growth of credit, asset prices, and global ￿nancial imbalances,
policy-makers have been caught off their guard by the severity of the crisis and have had to take
unprecedented and dramatic steps to stabilise the ￿nancial system and the wider economy.
The coexistence of stable growth and in￿ation and a long-lasting credit and ￿nancial cycle
brought to an end by a global ￿nancial crisis challenges the macroeconomic consensus that has
grown up since the emergence of in￿ation as a major economic policy problem in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. That consensus stressed the importance of controlling in￿ation as an essential
underpinning for broader economic stability. However, taking a longer historical perspective, the
recent instability of the ￿nancial system is not unprecedented. It was an important feature of
economic cycles in the 19th century and early 20th century. With hindsight, perhaps, it is not the
return of ￿nancial instability that should surprise us but that it took so long.
This paper aims to identify some of the key challenges for macroeconomics and policy which are
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attempts to identify a single cause of the crisis are misplaced. The crisis was the consequence of
complex interactions between a range of factors and there is a risk that recent experience could
be repeated if this is not the basis upon which policy reforms are made. However, it would be too
ambitious to offer a menu of the precise measures which will be needed to prevent future crises.
Instead we scope out the likely research and policy agenda.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we set out an empirical study of the credit boom and its
associated phenomena. Second, we review theories of credit and ￿nancial cycles and show how
none of them provide a complete explanation of what has happened. Third, we consider the
global macroeconomic context in which the boom took place. Finally, we set out some of the key
challenges now facing macroeconomics and policy.
2 Empirical Assessment
It is generally agreed that preceding the current ￿nancial crisis there was a ￿nancial boom of
some sort. There is no such general agreement, however, about when the boom began, how long
it lasted, how pronounced it was, whether it can be viewed as a single event or a succession of
different ones, and how US-centred it was. The purpose of this section is to provide some
perspective on these issues. We start by providing an assessment of the boom in traditional bank
lending at both the country and global levels. We then broaden our analysis to the shadow
banking and broader ￿nancial systems. Finally, following previous work that has shown clear
links between credit and other business cycle phenomena, we identify some of the boom’s
associated macroeconomic features.
2.1 Bank Lending
We begin by considering bank lending to ￿rms and households. This measure of credit has been
the main focus of previous empirical studies of advanced economy credit booms such as Borio,
Kennedy and Prowse (1994), Hofmann (2001), Borio and Lowe (2002), Mendoza and Terrones
(2008), as well as numerous other papers on emerging market ￿nancial crises. The two most
popular indicators analysed in these previous papers have been the bank lending to GDP ratio
and bank lending per capita. There are merits to each but the former is the more popular when
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to focus on. To help cross-country comparability we follow Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and
use the IMF’s estimates of the banking sector’s claims on the domestic private sector. This is
available at an annual frequency in the IMF’s IFS database for 33 advanced and emerging
countries from 1965 to 2007.1
Chart 1 shows our estimates of the aggregate bank lending ratios for the advanced, emerging and
world aggregate measures computed using the IMF’s purchasing power parity GDP weights for
2000. It shows the previous global credit booms in the early 1970s and mid-to-late 1980s as
hump-shaped phenomena, lasting between two and ￿ve years. In this regard, the boom since the
late 1990s is different. In the late 1990s, the world credit ratio seemed to be following the usual
hump-shaped path with an up-leg of about three years’ duration. It then began to tail off. But at
the turn of the millennium it stopped conforming with the previous hump-shaped pattern by
embarking on a second up-leg that continued up to 2007, the last year in our sample. The ￿rst leg
appears to have been led, albeit brie￿y, by the emerging economies and the second leg both led
and dominated by the advanced economies.
This broad-brush picture is con￿rmed by formal empirical methods. Recent work along these
lines has usually involved ￿rst calculating the deviation of the bank lending ratio from an
estimate of its trend using a statistical ￿lter and then using thresholds to gauge whether a boom
has taken place, when it started and ended, and when it peaked. We have taken a similar
approach. However, unlike earlier studies our focus is on a boom that has only recently ended
and so it was important for us to use a method of analysis that takes account of the end-point
problems of statistical ￿lters. For this reason we employed the expanding Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter
used in Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001). This extends the sample over which the
￿lter is applied by one year as each successive year in the sample is added such that for any point
in time the trend is estimated on the basis of the data up to, but not beyond, the point in time in
question. While this does not remove the end-point problem of statistical ￿lters it ensures that the
recent boom is at least being compared with previous booms on an equal footing and that its
results are not dependent on the future path of the bank lending ratio. However, it does not rule
out the possibility that the results could change in the light of revisions to recent data.
1Data for China are available only from 1980 and data for Norway end in 2006.
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ranging from an arbitrary constant to a multiple of the standard deviation of the bank lending
ratio. Given our focus on analysing the current boom and not earlier ones, instead of setting an
arbitrary threshold, we chose to calibrate it so that it generated results consistent with historical
accounts and previous studies. We found that this was best achieved using a hybrid threshold that
was related to whichever was the smallest of the panel (split into advanced and emerging groups)
and individual country standard deviations. The boom threshold was set at one standard
deviation while the limit thresholds ￿ which determine when the boom begins and ends ￿ were
set at half a standard deviation.
The results for booms ending before 2007 are shown in Table 1. Re￿ecting the way in which our
thresholds were chosen the historically important booms are well identi￿ed. The early 1970s
global boom is picked up, led by the US and the UK; the 1980s global boom also registers; and
those in Japan and Sweden (and the rest of Scandinavia) are dated accurately from 1986 to
1989/1990; the German post-uni￿cation boom is evident; and the end years of the 1990s booms
in Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore all accord closely with the timing of their
respective crises. Inevitably, there are some Type I and Type II errors: Korea is identi￿ed as
being in a boom during the Asian economic crisis from 1997 to 2002; the 1980s boom in the UK
appears too long (1981-1989); and the US boom of the 1980s seems to end too early (1987).2 On
balance, however, the approach appears reasonably ef￿cient at identifying not only the vast
majority of historically signi￿cant booms, but also their start and end dates.
The results for those booms that were ongoing in 2007 are shown in Table 2. Of the 33 countries
in our sample 15 are found to have been in the midst of a boom that year. Even so, the world
aggregate measure does not show that a boom was occurring at the global level. This seems to be
because of the in￿uence of Japan and Germany: excluding them suggests that a global boom was
underway by 2005 and followed an earlier boom between 1998 and 2001.3 Relative to the
historical record, the average length of the booms has been nearly twice as long; the increase in
2The Korean boom is consistent with the observed upward trend in the bank lending ratio over this period but it is driven by falling
nominal GDP rather than rising bank lending; the early start of the UK boom can probably be attributed to the extensive ￿nancial
liberalisation that took place throughout the decade by successive Thatcher governments; and the early end of the US boom most likely
re￿ects the limitations of using bank lending as the principal indicator for an economy that relies heavily on capital markets. We found
that by applying the same method to a broader measure of credit which includes capital markets extended the duration of the US boom in
the 1980s by another year.
3The US was almost unique in experiencing a boom between 2003 and 2005.
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It also appears that the US may have played a leading role, with its boom starting in 1995
compared with mean and median start dates of 2001 or 2002, as shown in Chart 2. The deviation
in the US is estimated to have been larger than for the rest of the world, but not the average for
other advanced economies, re￿ecting the upward in￿uence from a number of euro-area countries,
possibly owing to them having experienced falling interest rates associated with their
membership of the single European currency (Spain, Ireland, Finland, and Greece). All in all, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the de￿ning characteristics of the expansion in bank lending
are that it has been unusually long, US-led, and concentrated in the advanced economies.
2.2 The Shadow Banking System
While the previous focus on bank lending has the advantage of being applicable to a large set of
countries covering both advanced and emerging economies stretching over a long period of time
it does not give consideration to the broader ￿nancial expansion that seems to have taken place.
Financial market commentators and participants regularly point to this having been an important,
if not the most important, feature of the past decade. One aspect of this phenomenon is the
so-called shadow banking system ￿ largely unregulated ￿nancial institutions such as investment
banks, hedge funds, SIVs, conduits, and monolines ￿ which increased the availability of
non-bank credit to households and ￿rms.
The OECD publish total economy ￿nancial balance sheet data which can be used to gauge the
overall size of the shadow banking system of the advanced economies.4 Chart 3 shows that for
both the US and the rest of the OECD the shadow banking system represents an important source
of credit for households and ￿rms, amounting to nearly 120% of GDP in the US and more than
60% of GDP elsewhere in the OECD. However, while in the US there has been a rapid increase
in non-bank credit to households and ￿rms since the mid-1990s it has been broadly stable
elsewhere. This suggests that the growth of the shadow banking system has been largely a US
phenomenon.
4No equivalent data are available for the emerging economies. However, the advanced economies remain dominant when it comes to
capital markets. In 2007, the G7 group of leading industrial economies still accounted for 64% of global capital markets and the IMF’s
group of advanced economies accounted for 81%. Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008, Data Appendix Table 3:
Size of Capital Markets.
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been happening to the asset side of the ￿nancial sector’s balance sheet. There are many banks
that have continued to supply loans but with an increasing reliance on wholesale funding markets
as opposed to traditional customer deposits. Growth of the shadow banking system when
measured in this way has been more pronounced, especially in the OECD ex-US economies, as
shown in Chart 4.
More intriguingly, the US data suggest that the growth of the shadow banking sector over the past
decade merely extends a trend whose origins can be traced to the early 1980s. This picture of a
much longer-lasting and broader ￿nancial expansion is even more evident when non-credit
components of the ￿nancial balance, such as equity liabilities, are included, as shown in Chart 5.
This is potentially signi￿cant as the total economy ￿nancial balance sheet is a superior measure
of overall ￿nancial expansion as it is nearly four times the size of the combined traditional and
shadow banking system balance sheets, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. The evolution of its ￿nancial
sector component, in particular, would seem to be consistent with the view of some ￿nancial
market practitioners, such as Soros (2008), who argue that the global ￿nancial system has been in
the throes of a ‘Super-Bubble’ since the mid-1980s rather than since the late 1990s, as shown in
Chart 6.5
2.3 Households and Firms
The OECD ￿nancial balance sheet data also provide the opportunity for more detailed analysis.
Chart 7 shows a broader measure of credit ￿ comprising credit from the traditional and shadow
banking system credit and bonds issued in the capital markets ￿ which indicates there has also
been two phases to the credit expansion beginning in the mid-1990s. In the ￿rst phase, which
runs from the mid-1990s to around 2000, both the US and rest of the OECD experienced a rapid
increase in the credit ratio of ￿rms, most likely linked to the dot-com boom. Over the same
period, the household sector credit ratios increased only moderately. The second phase, which
5Note that even the total economy unconsolidated ￿nancial balance sheet understates the size of ￿nancial liabilities as it excludes
derivatives. According to the Bank for International Settlements the gross market value of OTC derivatives in the G10 economies plus
Switzerland stood at over $20trn in June 2008 and the notional value of these derivatives totalled $684trn. Since June 1998, these
amounts have increased nearly tenfold which would appear to be consistent with a much broader ￿nancial boom having taken place.
However, the relatively short history of these series on derivatives means that they are hard to interpret.
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sector credit ratio. This is mirrored neither in the rest of the OECD nor in the ￿rm credit ratios.
However, the aggregate OECD ex-US data mask considerable variations across countries in the
second phase, as shown in Table 5, where three things stand out. First, although the rise in
household sector credit ratio after 2000 for the aggregate OECD ex-US measure was
unremarkable there were numerous economies that witnessed sharp rises, some far greater than
in the US. In fact, of a total of 20 countries a quarter witnessed faster increases in the household
sector credit ratio than the US. Second, Japan and Germany are clear outliers. They are the only
two economies to have witnessed a decline in the household sector credit ratio and, given their
high GDP weights, they affect the OECD ex-US data considerably. Excluding these two
economies suggests that the US experience was common across many other economies. Finally,
a similar pattern, albeit much less pronounced, emerges for ￿rms.
On the basis of this analysis it seems reasonable to conclude that the acceleration in private
sector credit ￿ a much broader measure of credit than bank lending ￿ began with an expansion of
￿rm sector credit but intensi￿ed after around 2000 with an unusually pronounced rise in
household sector credit. This is most evident in the US but was also a feature of many OECD
economies other than Japan and Germany.
2.4 Associated Business Cycle Phenomena
We now turn to the issue of other business cycle phenomena that have been associated with the
growth of private sector credit. It is worth starting by considering the stylised facts. Much of the
research in this ￿eld has originated from the Bank for International Settlements, which has
campaigned to increase the weight given to credit by policy-makers over the past decade. Its
most extensive work is that of Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). Although the primary focus
of their paper is an examination of asset price ￿uctuations across 13 major OECD countries it
concludes ￿This study has argued that a distinguishing feature of the pronounced medium-term
asset price ￿uctuations observed since the early 1980s has been the role of credit. The major
expansion of credit in the wake of a substantial heightening of competitive pressures in the
￿nancial industry appears to have been a signi￿cant factor in facilitating and sustaining the
upswing. It may also have exacerbated the downswing￿. Hofmann (2001) turns this analysis on
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since 1980 based on a cointegrating VAR. He concludes that long-run developments in credit
cannot be explained by the usual determinants of output and real interest rates unless a role for
real property prices is also included. He also ￿nds a signi￿cant two-way dynamic interaction
between bank credit and property prices. Borio and Lowe (2002) assess the reliability of credit
and asset price indicators as predictors of ￿nancial crises and ￿nd that ￿￿nancial imbalances can
build up in a low in￿ation environment￿.
A more recent piece of work by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) has also made an important
contribution by examining the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates and ￿rm-level data
during credit boom periods in both industrial and emerging economies. Although its primary
focus is on identifying differences between cyclical patterns in industrial and emerging
economies some common patterns emerge, including that ￿credit booms across emerging and
industrial economies are associated with a well-de￿ned pattern of economic expansion in the
build-up phase of the booms, followed by contraction in the declining phase. Output,
expenditures, stock prices, housing prices, and the real exchange rate move above trend in the
￿rst phase, and drop below trend in the second phase, and the current account falls ￿rst and then
rises. All of this happens without major changes in in￿ation￿. Owing to the greater prevalence of
credit booms in emerging markets, there have been a much larger number of studies that have
investigated credit booms in emerging market economies, such as Gourinchas, Valdes, and
Landerretche (2001), Cottarelli, Giovanni, and Vladkova-Hollar (2003) and International
Monetary Fund (2004). They have generally con￿rmed similar, though more pronounced,
patterns in emerging market credit boom episodes.
Chart 8 and Table 6 provide a snapshot of some of the global business cycle indicators
highlighted in these studies. The ￿rst thing to note is that the experience of the past decade
broadly aligns with the stylised facts. For the OECD economies where the boom was
concentrated real short- and long-term interest rates declined; there was a rapid increase in global
asset prices covering equity prices in the ￿rst phase and property prices throughout; the real
exchange rate strengthened, albeit only a little; and the current account balance fell. It is also
evident that the rise in credit was not associated with an increase in OECD in￿ation, either at an
aggregate level, as shown in Chart 9, or on a cross-country basis, as shown in Chart 10.
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Lowe and Mendoza and Terrones. What is surprising is that there does not seem to have been an
increase in output growth either. Average real output growth in the OECD economies between
1996 and 2007 was 2.8%, which is identical to the 20-year and 30-year average growth rates.
Excluding the economies of Japan and Germany, which did not experience a credit boom, does
not change the overall picture, as shown in Chart 11. That said, there is some association
between output growth and changes in the credit ratio on a cross-country basis, as shown in Chart
12, although it is not striking if Japan is taken out of the picture. What is striking is that outside
the OECD output growth has risen to an unprecedented extent. The move to stronger growth
began in the late 1990s and has gained considerable strength over the past ￿ve years. It also led
to the emergence of in￿ationary pressures in non-OECD economies, although this has been
signi￿cantly affected by commodity price changes as opposed to underlying in￿ation pressures.
In other words, somewhat paradoxically, it appears that output and in￿ation were generally stable
in the advanced economies where the credit expansion was concentrated but increased in the
emerging economies where it was not.
Having sketched out the main empirical features of the credit boom and its associated
macroeconomic features the following two sections will attempt to account for them. Section 3
assesses existing theories of credit and ￿nancial cycles and Section 4 considers what role may
have been played by the broader macroeconomic context in which the credit boom took place.
3 Theories of Credit and Financial Cycles
The empirical assessment highlighted that the past decade’s credit boom was unusual in two
respects. First, it was highly persistent, with booms in most countries lasting about twice as long
as the average of booms since 1970. Second, it was generally associated with neither stronger
output growth nor in￿ation in the economies in which it took place. The main purpose of this
section is to establish how consistent existing economic theory is with these empirical ￿ndings.
We ￿rst assess the orthodox macroeconomic business cycle model; we then consider the merits
of the rival monetarist model; and ￿nally we survey some prominent heterodox models.
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 27 June 2009 133.1 The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
The state-of-the-art orthodox macroeconomic model is the Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model. A fusion of the Real Business Cycle models of the 1980s and the
New Keynesian sticky price models of the early 1990s, this model initially incorporated no role
for credit and ￿nancial cycles at all. This changed following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist’s
(1998) landmark paper which incorporated heterogeneous ￿rms and a credit market motivated by
asymmetric information into a Dynamic New Keynesian model. The result was a new collateral
channel through which changes in asset prices could lead to pro-cyclical changes in credit with
effects on investment demand. This so-called ‘￿nancial accelerator’ has since been established as
a standard feature in many DSGE models with researchers over the past decade having focused
their efforts on extending the role of credit frictions to heterogeneous households and introducing
a ‘cost channel’ through which the cost of external ￿nance has an impact on ￿rms’ costs and
prices. These models have been successfully calibrated to reproduce the business cycle
characteristics extracted from VAR representations of historical data.
However, it is not clear that they can account for the more pronounced credit and asset price
cycles that occur from time to time, including the one observed over the past decade. The
￿nancial accelerator may lead to credit acting as an powerful propagator of shocks but it does not
result in credit being a driver of business cycle ￿uctuations. This is because the standard DSGE
model incorporates three key assumptions: the ef￿cient markets hypothesis; the rational
expectations hypothesis; and optimising agents. These assumptions ensure that there is a strong
tendency for the economy to converge towards its steady-state equilibrium; that macroeconomic
￿uctuations occur because the economy is subjected to real and monetary shocks and there are
nominal and real rigidities that prevent agents from adjusting instantaneously to them; and that
￿nancial markets mirror economic fundamentals rather than act as independent source of shocks
to which agents must adjust. The introduction of the ￿nancial accelerator, therefore, results in
credit and ￿nancial cycles that are only pseudo-endogenous in that can only be as pronounced as
the economic cycle underlying it.6
Serially correlated positive supply, monetary or demand shocks are the standard explanation for a
6It is possible to generate economic effects in response to a change in the structural parameters related to the ￿nancial accelerator in
DSGE models but they are not generally viewed as quantitatively signi￿cant.
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are hard to reconcile with the empirical features of the past decade because it is not clear how
these shocks would have generated higher credit and asset prices but not higher output and
in￿ation. It is for these reasons that many orthodox economists have argued that the origins of
the credit and asset price cycle can be found in the process of globalisation. The two most
popular explanations are the ￿global savings glut￿ theory associated with Ben Bernanke and the
shortage of ￿nancial assets theory associated with Ricardo Caballero. According to these
theories, robust supply-driven growth in emerging economies created an excess of savings over
investment which has ￿owed to the advanced economies either as a consequence of policy
choices (to support export-led growth) or because their ￿nancial systems are unable to absorb
such high savings (the ￿nancial asset shortage). The result is capital ￿ows into advanced
economy ￿nancial markets, low advanced economy interest rates, and current account
imbalances. At the global level the relatively modest impact on in￿ation despite stronger output
growth is explained by the increased growth being supply-driven.7
However, while the process of globalisation is undoubtedly important ￿ as will be emphasised in
section 4 ￿ it does not rescue the orthodox model in our view. First, it does not explain why the
boom lasted so long. Ef￿cient markets would normally have been expected to generate a rapid
increase in asset prices when the positive supply shock emerged, not a gradually intensifying
boom that transitioned rapidly into crisis. Second, it does not explain how such a pronounced
credit and ￿nancial cycle coexisted with neither higher growth nor rising in￿ation in the
economies where it took place. This sort of separation of the real and ￿nancial economies is
incompatible with both the ef￿cient markets hypothesis and the ￿nancial accelerator. Third, the
increase in credit in the advanced economies far exceeded the net in￿ows of capital from
emerging economies. This suggests that most of the credit expansion in the advanced economies
was created domestically.8 Fourth, the link between credit and international capital ￿ows appears
to have been asymmetric. Our analysis of bank lending suggests that there were credit booms in
many of the large emerging economies, such as China from 1997-2000, India from 1998-2007
and Brazil from 2000-2007 despite the out￿ows of capital which the emerging economies
experienced. Finally, it does not explain why the boom came to an end. There is little evidence to
7The stability of in￿ation may have been further aided by the low level of interest rates operating through the cost channel mechanism
highlighted previously.
8For the US the increase in credit amounted to ￿ve times net foreign in￿ows over the period 1998-2007. See section 4.1 for details.
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globalisation nor its associated international ￿ows suddenly stopped in 2007. Consequently, the
orthodox account of the crisis is left having to explain many of the most important features of the
past decade as a series of exogenous shocks. This does not seem to be much of an explanation at
all, especially when these exogenous shocks are also hard to identify.
3.2 Monetarism and the Market for Assets
DSGE models typically have a very simpli￿ed monetary transmission mechanism. They neglect
money and credit and focus heavily on the role of interest rates instead, which in many cases is
summarised by the central bank’s of￿cial interest rate. There is, however, a long tradition of
alternative, monetarist, thinking in which money and credit are seen as much more important.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) provide extensive accounts of how ￿nancial
crises are episodic and largely exogenous phenomena which have cyclical consequences
operating principally via declines in deposit-currency ratios and their effects on the stock of
money. It is not unreasonable to think that the breakdown of the asset backed commercial paper
(ABCP) markets in August 2007 was the shadow banking system’s equivalent of banking panics
from an earlier era which then spread to encompass the entire ￿nancial system. On this view, the
shadow banking system’s inability to acquire high powered or commercial bank money when
holders of ABCP failed to rollover their funding might be seen as crucial. But even if the
monetarists are right to suggest that in earlier crises there was no deterioration in credit quality
and so the banking panics were largely exogenous this does not seem to be a reasonable view to
take this time. Not only does the magnitude and duration of the preceding credit boom point to
the likelihood of a steady deterioration of credit quality over time but the source of the crisis is
easily traced to delinquencies and defaults on sub-prime mortgages.
Nevertheless, the monetarist ideas on which these accounts are based have evolved considerably
since they were ￿rst developed. Later versions include models where money, credit, and asset
prices are explicitly modelled as part of the monetary transmission mechanism. For example,
Brunner and Meltzer (1988) present an extended IS-LM model in which money and credit are
part of the ￿market for assets￿ in which agents are continually rebalancing their portfolios in
response to exogenous shocks and changes in monetary policy. In this way asset prices are the
principal mechanism by which short-run equilibrium is achieved. They emphasise that their
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credit market effects independent of monetary effects. The issue of whether credit or money
matters for output or asset prices has no meaning￿. What this implies is that credit and asset price
shocks are potentially just as valid sources of business cycle ￿uctuations as are real and monetary
shocks. Their effects, however, vary depending on the nature of the shock considered.
It is, for example, possible to generate credit and asset prices cycles in this model via shocks to
expectations and ￿nancial innovation. In the context of the global credit boom, three properties
from the Brunner-Meltzer model are worth considering. First, in response to a fall in interest
rates the effect in this model is to increase both money demand and the asset price level but with
an ambiguous effect on credit demand.9 This would suggest that a factor other than loose
monetary policy may be needed to explain credit and asset price cycles. Second, in response to
an increase in the expected return to real assets both the asset price and the demand for credit
increases but with an ambiguous effect on money demand.10 This would seem to support the case
for seeing credit as a facilitator of asset price cycles driven by expectations. Third, in response to
an increase in credit supply, perhaps following some form of ￿nancial innovation, the effect is to
lower interest rates and increase both asset prices and money demand. In all these cases the
extent to which output and in￿ation respond depend on interest rate and wealth effects on
aggregate demand.11
However, while this model can account for a pronounced credit and ￿nancial cycle in the short
run it is hard to reconcile it with the long-lasting credit expansion that has just been observed
without resorting to the possibility of serially correlated real and monetary shocks. Neither does
it explain why, given that the cycle did last for such a long time, the effects on output and prices
were so modest. Finally, in common with other traditional macroeconomic models, it suffers
from inadequate micro-foundations. This means that it is vulnerable to the Lucas critique and is
of little use when assessing the role that policy might have played in generating both the boom
9The ambiguous credit demand response arises because the fall in interest rates will tend to have a positive effect but the rise in asset
prices will tend to have a negative effect by lowering the cost of equity ￿nancing and thereby the need for bank credit. Some readers may
wonder how powerful this is given the possibility of collateral effects along the lines of the ￿nancial accelerator used in DSGE models. It
is noted later that speculative asset price expectations may be an additional reason for thinking that credit demand may increase in
response to a rise in asset prices. See footnote 12.
10The ambiguous money demand response arises because the increase in the expected return to real assets will tend to have a negative
effect but the increase in asset prices will tend to have a positive effect.
11Output and in￿ation respond with a lag owing to price and wage rigidities. As they adjust the movements in the market for assets will
reverse either partially or in full, depending on the nature of the shock.
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provides important insights into the processes by which the credit and ￿nancial cycle might have
been partly an endogenous phenomenon.
3.3 The Austrian, Post Keynesian, and Behavioural Schools
We now consider a number of prominent heterodox business cycle theories that have been
developed over the course of the past 100 years. In many ways they are more consistent with the
empirical literature on credit and ￿nancial cycles than the orthodox model and, in some cases, the
monetarist model too. But they pose bigger challenges to conventional macroeconomic ideas.
We begin by presenting a general account of credit and ￿nancial cycles as documented by
historians of panics and crashes; we then identify three heterodox ‘schools’: Austrian; Post
Keynesian; and Behavioural.
Economic historians have documented episodes of asset price speculation driving both credit and
business cycles for a long time. One of the earliest examples of this approach is that of George
(1879) who noticed cyclical advances in land values that resulted from speculation regarding
their future path based on expectations of rapid economic progress which later turned out to be
unwarranted. He concluded that the advance of land values was ￿the primary cause of recurring
paroxysms of industrial depression￿ which ￿cuts down the earnings of labour and capital and
checks production￿. Seventy-￿ve years later, Galbraith (1954) provided a descriptive account of
how the 1929 stock market crash contributed to the Great Depression and this approach was
generalised by Kindleberger (1978) who chronicled manias, panics and crashes over many
centuries and countries, stretching back to the South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles of 1719-1720.
An important part of Kindleberger’s analysis was how he showed that Minsky’s (1975) stylised
model of ￿nancial instability had applied time and time again in these cases. The ￿anatomy of a
typical crisis￿, according to Minsky and Kindleberger, is broadly as follows: The boom begins
with a big shock, or what is referred to as a ￿displacement￿. The boom is then fuelled by the
supply of credit because banks are competing with each other for market share. A euphoric phase
follows when investors buy assets, not with a view to making direct use of them or for the income
they might generate, but to pro￿t from capital gains. This transitions into mania whereby, having
observed others pro￿ting hugely from the boom, additional investors become frantically
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the banks observe that the net worth of investors participating in the boom has increased along
with their own pro￿ts. Eventually, as buyers become less eager and the sellers become more
eager a period of ￿nancial distress follows. With asset prices now declining, highly leveraged
investors may become bankrupt. There may then be a speci￿c event, such as the failure of a
major bank or ￿rm, which signals a more dramatic price reversal. Kindleberger and Aliber
(2005) have since updated the analysis to include the Kipper- und Wipperzeit monetary crisis of
1619-1622, the Tulip Bubble of 1636-1637, and more recent cycles such as in Japan in 1980s and
Asia in the 1990s. It ￿nds that the same patterns as those that were set out in the original
Minsky-Kindleberger thesis are repeated. In each case an increased supply of credit is identi￿ed
as an important facilitator of the boom.
In our view, while it is of interest that many of the events of the past decade seem to have echoes
of previous experiences the accounts of the economic historians do not amount to a theory of
credit and ￿nancial cycles and so do not increase our understanding of recent events. But there
are a number of heterodox theories which do, including the Austrian School, which was among
the ￿rst to put credit at the heart of a business cycle theory.13 The capital theory originated by
Menger (1871) and the theory of money and credit developed by Mises (1912) were the
micro-foundations upon which Hayek’s (1929) ‘Austrian’ business cycle model was built. It is
the injection of credit by the central bank, resulting in the market rate of interest falling beneath
that of the natural rate of interest, which initiates the boom.14 Desired investment rises and
desired saving falls with the difference between the two being met by the increase in credit. This
puts in motion an inter-temporally unstable process because the investment is not being ￿nanced
by genuine savings re￿ecting a willingness to postpone consumption. The boom is therefore
inevitably followed by bust.
Intriguingly, in Austrian theory, the boom need not be associated with in￿ation because the
upward pressure on prices following a credit-￿nanced increase in demand may be offset by the
downward pressure on prices from the rise in supply capacity associated with the higher level of
12This aspect of Minsky’s ￿nancial instability hypothesis shows how, as a special case within the Brunner and Meltzer model, expected
higher returns to real assets may trigger a self-ful￿lling upward spiral in which the usual negative effect on credit demand from rising
asset prices is dominated by speculators who make credit-￿nanced acquisitions of real assets in anticipation of capital gains.
13See the appendix on ￿A Brief History of the Role of Credit in Business Cycle Theory￿.
14The concept of the natural rate of interest was ￿rst proposed by Wicksell (1898) and in Austrian theory it is equivalent to the rate of
interest that would prevail in the absence of credit creation.
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premise of rising future consumption that it becomes clear that the long-run the effect on the
economy’s capacity to produce has been negligible. This important characteristic of the model is
highlighted by Robbins (1934) who traces the origins of the Great Depression to the preceding
non-in￿ationary credit boom of the late 1920s. Modern-day Austrians, such as Roger Garrison,
were also among the ￿rst economists to argue that the credit-based boom of the 1990s would
prove to be unsustainable and that attempts to prolong the boom would only serve to increase the
severity of the eventual downturn. However, in our view, the Austrians were right for largely the
wrong reasons. Their theory explains neither the recent boom’s unusual length nor the absence of
stronger output growth. Moreover, its concentration in the household sector could be viewed as
contradicting Austrian theory.
The Post Keynesian model developed in Minsky’s (1986) ￿￿nancial instability hypothesis￿ was
intended to provide a more rigorous theoretical explanation for the phenomena documented by
the economic historians.15 Minksy was an American Post Keynesian economist for whom
￿nancial institutions and structures were central to understanding business cycle dynamics. He
argued that capitalist economies are inherently, or endogenously, unstable and that the
neoclassical model is fundamentally ￿awed in assuming that in the absence of exogenous shocks
the economy will converge to steady-state equilibrium (the neoclassicists assume, in Minksy’s
words, that the economy is ‘coherent’). Business cycles should instead be thought of as ￿due to
the internal processes of our type of economy. The dynamics of a capitalist economy which has
complex, sophisticated, and evolving ￿nancial structures leads to the development of conditions
conducive to incoherence ￿ to runaway in￿ations or deep depressions￿.16
The origin of this ￿nancial instability depends on an endogenous transition in ￿nancing from
hedge to speculative and Ponzi structures. The ￿rst of these consists of units that can pay both
principal and interest out of cash ￿ows; the second, of units that can pay only interest; and the
third, of units that can pay neither. Minsky’s ￿rst theorem is that when hedge ￿nance dominates,
15There are numerous divisions within the Post Keynesian school. In this paper when we use the term Post Keynesian we refer to the
American Post Keynesian version developed by Hyman Minsky. For an introduction to Post Keynesian thinking and some of the
divisions within it see Davidson (2005). A fully-speci￿ed European/UK Post Keynesian model in which the banking sector plays an
important role in economic ￿uctuations can be found in Godley and Lavoie (2007).
16Minsky (1986) sets out his theory in contrast to the dominant neoclassical theory of the time. Modern economic theory, as re￿ected in
DSGE models, continues to see the business cycle as being driven by exogenous shocks and so his criticisms are still relevant. However,
the propagation mechanisms are more explicit in today’s orthodox models than they were when Minsky was writing.
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will be unstable. His second theorem is that over periods of prolonged prosperity the ￿nancing
structure will, as a natural consequence of the incentives ￿nanciers face, endogenously transition
from a stable to an unstable regime.
The Post Keynesian model is possibly unique in suggesting that credit and ￿nancial cycles
emerge from an entirely endogenous process in response to continuous ￿nancial innovation and
periods of economic stability which encourage greater risk taking. It is also designed to generate
credit and ￿nancial cycles which may ultimately lead to either in￿ation or depression. The
Minsky model is therefore highly compatible with the empirical features of the past decade. But
there are a number of problems with it too. It does not explain how an unprecedented period of
economic stability could coexist with an unprecedented ￿nancial boom for quite so long. The
transition from stability to instability appears to have been implausibly slow and the absence of
higher output growth and in￿ation is left unexplained. It also suffers from a lack
micro-foundations. It therefore has many useful insights but would need further development to
account for all the characteristics of the business cycle just observed.
The Behavioural approach is, essentially, a version of the economic historians’ account of asset
price cycles but with the micro-foundations of irrational behaviour made more explicit and based
on evidence from psychological experiments. Credit does not attract any special treatment in
these accounts but it is still seen as an important facilitator, with lenders being subject to
similarly irrational behaviours as the investors who borrow to buy assets. Examples of irrational
behaviours include anchoring, persistent biases, overcon￿dence and herding.17 Recent analysis
of ￿nancial cycles that use behavioural models to explain bubbles include Shiller (2000, 2008)
and Akerlof and Shiller (2009). In these accounts it is shown how precipitating factors, such as
the invention of the internet and the low level of nominal interest rates, led to the NASDAQ stock
market bubble of 1999-2000 and the US real estate bubble of 2000-2006. Popular ￿nancial
market writers, such as Taleb (2004, 2007) and Soros (2008), have endorsed views of investor
irrationality that are compatible with the existence of ￿nancial cycles of the sort described by the
Behavioural School. But while their theory might be an explanation for why credit and asset
price cycles occur, in common with others, it does not help to shed light on why the recent cycle
lasted for so long and did not translate into stronger growth and rising in￿ation.
17For a collection of writings on behavioural economics see Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004).
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The previous section illustrated how existing economic theories fail to provide an adequate
account of many of the key empirical features of the recent credit and ￿nancial cycle. While the
monetarist and heterodox models ￿ especially that of Minsky ￿ provide important insights they
do not offer a complete explanation of events. This suggests that it is necessary to look elsewhere
for an explanation of what has happened. One possibility is that the cycle was heavily in￿uenced
by the unusual global macroeconomic context of the past decade. There are three important
macroeconomic features of the development of the world economy since the mid-1990s that
stand out: the emergence of signi￿cant global ￿nancial imbalances; the previous experience of
steady growth and low in￿ation in many advanced economies since the 1980s (known as the
Great Stability or Great Moderation); and a new phase of the globalisation of the world economy
which saw the integration of China and many other low cost producers into the global economic
system. In this section, we discuss how these developments ￿ and the conduct of monetary policy
￿ might explain both the intensity and persistence of the global credit boom and its coexistence
with stable growth and in￿ation in the economies where it took place.
4.1 Global Financial Imbalances
In the wake of the Asian ￿nancial crisis of 1997-8, there was an abrupt fall in investment in many
of the economies affected by the crisis. That, together with the competitive advantage of these
economies in export markets and a period of strong world economic growth, contributed to a
build up of substantial current account surpluses in these economies over the following decade.
Between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, substantial surpluses built up in China, other Asian
economies and subsequently in other developing economies which bene￿ted from rising oil and
commodity prices ￿ notably the Middle East. The counterpart of these surpluses were de￿cits in a
number of major advanced economies, the most striking of which was the United States. In 2007,
total current account surpluses in non-OECD economies totalled $894bn, of which the surplus of
China alone was $372bn ￿ over 40% of the total. In the same year, the US current account de￿cit
totalled $731bn. Spain ($125bn) and the UK ($105bn) were other notable de￿cit countries.18
The traditional macroeconomic interpretation of a situation like this would be that the de￿cit
18Data taken from the latest OECD Economic Outlook (2008), Annex Table 52.
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export performance in the surplus countries. This is consistent with Eichengreen (2007), who
argues that global imbalances and the ex-post excess of savings over investment in Asia and its
opposite in the US can best be seen as being driven by domestic US policies. Over a period of
time, exchange rates might be expected to adjust to eliminate these imbalances and promote
more balanced growth. However, the policies pursued by most Asian economies (including
China) blocked this process of adjustment. These policies were generally characterised by the
maintenance of competitive bilateral exchange rates against the dollar, the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves (principally in US dollars), export-led growth, and current account
surpluses.19
In the mid-2000s a number of other explanations came to be advanced for the emergence of
global imbalances which focussed more heavily on the ￿ow of savings from Asia and other
emerging market economies as a key driving force. Perhaps the best known of these explanations
is Bernanke’s (2005) ￿global saving glut￿ thesis in which it is argued that the excess of ex-ante
global savings over investment centred in Asia and oil-exporting economies led to both
downward pressure on global real interest rates and the widening of global imbalances. A variant
of the savings glut story is that of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) and Caballero (2006)
in which the coexistence of global imbalances and low interest rates stems not from a savings
glut so much as from a shortage of ￿nancial assets. According to this theory, following the Asian
￿nancial crisis in 1997-98, these economies’ capacity to generate ￿nancial assets had diminished,
with the consequence that Asian central banks stepped in to provide a ￿nancial intermediary role
whereby domestic savings were exported. It is further argued that the US is uniquely placed to
supply these ￿nancial assets given its large and mature capital markets and the reserve currency
status of the dollar.20
Could the emergence of this ￿savings glut￿ account for the credit boom in the US and other
major advanced economies? The ￿nancial ￿ows themselves cannot account for the growth of
19The exact motivation for the emergence of this policy mix is controversial, but Dooley, Folkarts-Landau and Garber (2003, 2004) talk
of a revived Bretton Woods system anchored on the dollar, pointing to an export-led development strategy of the emerging Asian
economies. Another variant along similar lines are those who suggest a ￿precautionary reserves￿ motive could lie behind emerging Asian
economies maintaining undervalued exchange rates to provide insurance against a ￿sudden stop￿ reversal of capital ￿ows. See, for
example, Miller and Zhang (2007).
20Dooley, Folkarts-Landau and Garber (2004) make a similar point regarding the uniqueness of the US but their emphasis is on the
openness of the US economy to Asian exports compared with those of other advanced economies, notably in Europe.
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of capital. For example, the US current account de￿cit deteriorated from about 1.5% of GDP in
the mid-1990s to average 4.5% of GDP in the period 1998-2007. Credit growth over this period
averaged around 14% of GDP each year ￿ almost 5 times as big as the extra 3% of GDP ￿owing
in from overseas to match the current account de￿cit. It is possible to envisage the ￿nancial
system intermediating to amplify the impact of ￿nancial in￿ows on credit growth, though we
would need a separate explanation why such a strong multiplier effect emerged in the late 1990s
and 2000s.
A more complex chain of causality is suggested by Bean (2008) and others, who argue that an
increased demand from Asian and other overseas investors for ￿safe￿ assets in Western
economies ￿ particularly US government bonds ￿ prompted a ￿search for yield￿ which led
investors and ￿nancial institutions to pursue more risky investment strategies. According to
Bean, ￿The present ￿nancial crisis has many parents, encompassing both market failures and
supervisory shortcomings ... But these are just the collective match that ignited the
con￿agration. You need fuel to make a ￿re too. And that was provided by the ex-ante excess
supply of global savings over investment, which pushed real interest rates on safe assets to
historically low levels, reinforced by loose monetary policy. That in turn encouraged a ‘search
for yield’ and a compression of risk premia as ￿nancial institutions sought returns high enough to
meet end-investors’ unchanged expectations.￿
But while this might appear super￿cially plausible, this line of argument does not sit comfortably
with some. It is certainly true that yields on US government bonds did fall over this period, and
that on average they were lower in real and nominal terms than in the 1980s and early 1990s. US
10-year bond yields fell in nominal terms from 6.5-7% in the mid-1990s to 4.5-5% in the
mid-2000s. But, as Shiller (2007) argues, the resulting level of nominal and real interest rates
was not especially low by historical standards. He calculates that the US long-term government
bond yield averaged 4.71% over the period 1871-2007 and that the ex-post real rate averaged
2.4% over the same period. Shiller compares this to an observed index-linked bond yield of
2.32% in August 2007. Our own calculations also imply an average real long-term bond rate of
2.3% over the period 1998-2007, while the credit boom was in￿ating.21
21Using data from the latest OECD Economic Outlook, US long-term interest rates (10-year benchmark bond yields) averaged 4.9% over
the period 1998-2007 relative to 2.6% CPI in￿ation.
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long-term US bond yields. Warnock and Warnock (2005) argue that in the absence of any foreign
in￿ows in the twelve months ending May 2005 the US ten-year Treasury yield would have been
150bp higher than otherwise, controlling for a range of other macroeconomic in￿uences. Had
foreign ￿ows been in line with their historical average of 2% of GDP, ten-year yields would have
been over 100bp higher. Focusing on the effect of foreign of￿cial ￿ows, these are also found to
have a sizeable, although somewhat smaller, effect of 60bp. These are signi￿cant changes, but
not historically large in terms of the long-term shifts we have seen in terms of US bond yields
over the last 100 years. For example, the data presented in Shiller (2007) shows the real ex-post
long-term bond yield ￿uctuating between around -2.5% and +2.5% between 1950 and the late
1970s and then ￿uctuating between +3 and +12% in the 1980s and early 1990s. Against this
background, the modest downward pressure on bond yields from capital in￿ows does not seem
suf￿cient to properly explain the scale and persistence of the credit boom observed from the late
1990s onwards.
There are a number of other problems with the ￿savings glut￿/￿search for yield￿ explanation of
the global credit boom of the 1990s and 2000s. First, when the returns on safe assets fall, it is not
obvious that investors should shift their portfolios towards riskier assets. The positive correlation
between risk and return is a well established property of ￿nance theory which goes back to
Markowitz (1952, 1959) and was developed by Tobin (1958) and Sharpe (1963). So we need an
explanation of how a sophisticated and diverse community of ￿nancial professionals believed
these rules had somehow been suspended in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A more rational
response to a fall in real yields would be for investors who faced a fall in returns to increase their
savings to match their required income. Indeed, this income effect predominated in the 1970s,
when in￿ation eroded the real value of savings and created negative real returns causing a rise in
the personal savings rate in the UK and some other economies (Taylor and Threadgold, 1978).
Second, while the ￿savings glut￿ hypothesis might have played a part in the evolution of current
account imbalances in the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis, it appears a less obvious
explanation of developments in the 2000s. Between 1997 and 2000, there was a signi￿cant shift
in the current account position of non-OECD economies, which moved from a de￿cit of $55bn
dollars to a surplus of $165bn. At the same time, OECD economies moved from a surplus of
$36bn in 1997 to a de￿cit of $341bn in 2000, with a large part of the deterioration accounted for
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slowed sharply in 2001 and 2002, there was then a further accumulation of surpluses outside the
OECD economies in the mid-2000s, matched by a further widening in the de￿cits in the US and
a number of other major advanced economies.
This further widening of imbalances in the mid-2000s looks much more like a consequence of
the credit boom than a driver of it.23 It was underpinned by very strong export-led growth in
China and other Asian economies, accompanied by a steady rise in oil and other commodity
prices ￿ which boosted the surpluses in the Middle East and Africa. From very close to balance
in the early 2000s, the economies of Africa and the Middle East were running surpluses totalling
$336bn in 2007. This ￿second leg￿ to the development of global imbalances appears to be more
readily explained by strong growth of demand across the global economy, rather than a ￿global
savings glut￿ emerging from Asia. One of the consequences of this period of strong global
demand was upward pressure on oil and commodity prices, shifting the terms of trade in favour
of economies which were major producers of these globally traded products.
4.2 The ￿Great Stability￿, Globalisation and Monetary Policy
However, if the growth of global ￿nancial imbalances in the mid-2000s was more a consequence
than a cause of the global credit boom this raises the question of what the main drivers of the
rapid expansion of credit were. As we have already observed, output growth rates for the OECD
economies as a whole were not particularly strong over this period and in￿ation was subdued ￿
until the impact of oil and commodity price in￿ation was felt in 2007/8, as shown in Chart 13.
But there were a number of other macroeconomic phenomena ￿ including the ￿Great Stability￿
and globalisation ￿ which could have played a role. In this section we consider the contributions
made by these factors and the conduct of monetary policy to the credit and ￿nancial cycle of the
mid-2000s.
There are a number of different explanations for the ￿Great Moderation￿ or ￿Great Stability￿ ￿
good policy; good luck (or helpful economic circumstances); and favourable structural change.24
22Data from latest OECD Economic Outlook, Annex Table 52.
23This assessment is also consistent with a number of studies that use structural VARs to identify monetary and real shocks. See Bems,
Dedola and Smets (2007), Bracke and Fidora (2008), and Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007).
24The ￿Great Stability￿ and ￿Great Moderation￿ are terms used to describe the combination of low in￿ation and reduced output volatility
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monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s came to be directed more clearly towards achieving low
in￿ation, reducing the potential for in￿ationary ￿boom-bust￿ cycles. In particular, the
anti-in￿ationary credibility of central bank independence was extended across Europe in the late
1990s with the establishment of the ECB and the granting of operational independence to the
Bank of England. The impact of globalisation in reducing the prices of global manufactured
goods, coupled with the impact of the ￿Asian crisis￿, also helped to hold down in￿ation when
growth was strong in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. At the same time, US and European labour
markets had become more ￿exible as a result of policy measures and the experience of high
unemployment in the 1980s. This attenuated an important mechanism by which rising demand
translated into wage and price in￿ation in the 1970s and 1980s.
These dampening in￿uences on in￿ation were particularly noticeable in the response of the
OECD economies to the growth of domestic demand and GDP in the late 1990s. We noted
previously that output growth in the OECD economies was unremarkable compared with
historical averages between 1996 and 2007. However, as Chart 14 shows, growth in the OECD
economies in the ￿ve years 1996-2000 was nearly as strong as in the ￿ve years 1985 to 1989, and
if Japan is excluded from the comparison, the growth of the OECD economies in the late 1990s
exceeded the late 1980s. However, unlike the late 1980s, conventional measures of in￿ation did
not pick up signi￿cantly, and other warning signs of future in￿ation ￿ such as wage growth and
the rate of increase in nominal demand ￿ were not ringing alarm bells.
The global slowdown of 2001 and 2002 ￿ which was prompted by the puncturing of the US
￿dot-com￿ bubble, sharp falls in equity prices world wide, and the global political turmoil which
followed the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre ￿ therefore took place against a very
different backdrop from previous global postwar slowdowns when in￿ationary concerns were to
the fore. In the early 2000s, monetary authorities felt much more free to relax policy, and there
were growing concerns that de￿ation, rather than in￿ation, could become a problem (Bernanke,
2002). The result was a period of loose monetary policy, particularly in the US where the Fed
Funds rate was reduced initially to 1.75% by January 2002 and then as low as 1% in 2003. As
intended, a serious recession was avoided and the only major economy to experience a
experienced in the UK, US and a number of other major economies from the late 1980s or early 1990s onwards. For a summary of the
latest ideas and debates on this issue, see Young (2008). A summary of earlier literature can be found in Stock and Watson (2002).
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experienced a drop of 0.2% in activity in 2003).
However, this period of monetary relaxation created a series of unintended consequences which
were to have important consequences for the future development of the credit boom and the
resulting ￿nancial crisis. Instead of the normal pattern, where a period of strong growth is
followed by a recession in which ￿nancial excesses and imbalances are corrected, the monetary
relaxation of the early 2000s created extremely attractive borrowing conditions for consumers
and ￿rms, providing additional impetus to the growth of the credit. Lending in the housing
market grew particularly strongly, not just in the US, but in the UK, Spain, Australia and many
other economies. According to some economists, this period of monetary relaxation, which was
only gradually withdrawn during 2004 and 2005, was the main factor responsible for the housing
market lending excesses in the United States, which then led to the sub-prime crisis in 2007/8.25
By heading off recession and de￿ation in the early 2000s, this relaxation of monetary policy also
helped to ensure that the volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates ￿ notably GDP growth and
in￿ation ￿ remained subdued, perpetuating the view that macroeconomic risk had been reduced.
The interventions of central bankers, most notably Alan Greenspan in the United States, were
seen as crucial in maintaining this benign macroeconomic outcome. A perception began to
develop in ￿nancial markets that effective monetary policy was providing an insurance against
extreme macroeconomic risks ￿ known as ￿The Greenspan Put￿.
These developments were all crucial for the phase of the credit cycle which unfolded over the
mid-2000s. A direct stimulus to lending was provided by very low interest rates, particularly in
the United States. At the same time, the apparent reduction in macroeconomic volatility, and the
increased con￿dence in the stabilising power of monetary policy, encouraged ￿nancial markets
and investors to downplay macroeconomic risks, as Haldane (2009a, 2009b) has argued.26
Coupled with failures of banking governance and regulation, as well as dif￿culties in evaluating
increasingly complex ￿nancial products, this helped underpin investor demand for risky assets ￿
such as for the CDOs containing sub-prime loans that eventually triggered the crisis.
25Taylor (2007, 2009) makes this argument particularly forcefully. Ahrend et al (2008) also argue that a combination of loose monetary
policy and ￿nancial innovation account for the strong credit growth and rising asset prices in the mid-2000s.
26The importance of perceptions of macroeconomic risk for the valuation of asset prices may have been underestimated. Lettau et al
(2007), for example, show that macroeconomic volatility regime changes can have sizeable effects on the valuation of equity prices.
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seem to have provided a fertile environment for the global credit boom which developed over the
same period. While excess savings from Asian economies may have played a part in the ￿rst
phase of this period of credit growth, a number of other macroeconomic factors were more
signi￿cant in the 2000s. The interaction between the conduct of monetary policy and the
development of an increasingly globalised economic system was particularly important. The
absence of in￿ation in the aftermath of strong growth in the late 1990s allowed a relaxation in
monetary policy in the early 2000s, particularly in the United States. Instead of being snuffed out
by recession, the credit boom gained added impetus as a result. And the continuation of a period
of sustained growth with low in￿ation into the 2000s reinforced the perception of reduced
macroeconomic risks. This macroeconomic environment made it easier for banks and other
￿nancial institutions to make the misjudgements which have proved so costly for them and for
the wider economy.
4.3 The ￿Growth Puzzle￿ of the 2000s
The discussion above leaves one puzzle, however. Though economic growth in the major
advanced economies was strong in the late 1990s, this was followed by weak growth in the early
2000s. The second phase of the credit boom in the mid-2000s was not accompanied by
particularly strong growth in the US, UK and other European economies. As we observed earlier,
taking the period from the mid-1990s to 2007, the growth of output was broadly in line with past
historical averages, despite the very rapid growth of credit. The fact that growth was not
particularly strong also helps to explains the absence of signi￿cant in￿ationary pressures.
We see two main factors explaining this ￿growth puzzle￿. The ￿rst is that much of the strong
credit growth seems to have been used to ￿nance the acquisition of assets, notably housing and
innovative ￿nancial instruments, rather than expenditures. The reasons for the pronounced credit
and ￿nancial cycle have already been explained. But the fact that demand did not increase as
much as might have been expected requires further explanation. One reason is that the early
2000s was a period in which ￿rms were heavily engaged in repairing their balance sheets in the
aftermath of the dot-com boom. This meant that an important driver of the credit and ￿nancial
cycle ￿ easy ￿nancial conditions ￿ had relatively little impact on capital expenditures. At the
same time, there are a number of factors which may have acted to reduce the wealth effects from
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words, this was a credit and asset price cycle driven by factors that had a relatively limited impact
on demand and which generated relatively mild wealth effects on demand.27
The second factor is that, where demand did increase, a large portion spilled over into imports
and deteriorating in external balances. We noted earlier that the US, UK and Spain had
developed signi￿cant current account de￿cits by the mid-2000s, averaging 5.7%, 3.3% and 9.8%
of GDP respectively in the years 2005-7. These de￿cits suggest a signi￿cant cumulative growth
of demand in excess of output. Charts 15 and 16 suggest that this was a feature more generally
across countries with there being a stronger association between changes in credit ratios and both
domestic demand and current accounts than there is for GDP growth and in￿ation.28 The origins
of this high import leakage is most likely to be linked to declining competitiveness associated
with upward pressure on nominal exchange rates arising from capital ￿ows from slower growing
advanced economies with lower interest rates, the pegged exchange rate policies of the emerging
economies, and extensive trade liberalisation in the early 2000s including China’s admission to
the WTO and the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles.29
These demand spillovers were consequently re￿ected in strong export and output growth and the
build up of external surpluses in Japan, Germany, China and other emerging market economies.
So while output growth was not particularly strong in the major advanced economies in the
mid-2000s, this was still a period of strong global growth which led to upward pressure on
energy and commodity prices. This then led to a further build up of external surpluses in the
energy and commodity exporting economies.
27From a monetarist perspective the stability of nominal demand in response to the increase in the money supply associated with the
credit expansion implies that there was a corresponding rise in money demand. This too can be linked to the factors previously identi￿ed
￿ i.e., balance sheet adjustment by ￿rms and the origins of the reduced wealth effects from house prices to consumption.
28This pattern is consistent with the New Keynesian model developed by Nickell (1990) where there is a three-way trade-off between
unemployment, in￿ation and the trade balance. He calls this the economy’s ￿fundamental supply constraint￿ and demand shifts move the
economy along the constraint. Other things being equal, the coexistence of strong demand, stable in￿ation and low unemployment is
only possible if it is accompanied by a deterioration in the trade balance.
29Taken together the two factors we have identiftied ￿ the channelling of a large part of the credit growth into asset markets, notably
housing, and demand spillovers driving external imbalances ￿ are consistent with previous work by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008)
showing a link between current account balances and real estate markets.
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The previous section identi￿ed a number of factors associated with the unusual global
macroeconomic context of the past decade that seem to have been important in driving the recent
credit and ￿nancial cycle and its associated macroeconomic phenomena. It also highlighted how
the conduct of macroeconomic policy may have been part of the problem. This suggests that
there is plenty of scope for improving both theory and policy. In this section we identify some of
the challenges facing both. We discuss the need to: integrate endogenous credit and ￿nancial
cycles into orthodox macroeconomic models; improve understanding of macro-￿nancial
linkages; recognise the limitations of economic theory; develop tools for macro-prudential
regulation; and be realistic about the degree of macroeconomic stability that national monetary
policy can achieve in a highly integrated global economy.
5.1 Endogenous Credit and Financial Cycles
Incorporating endogenous credit and ￿nancial cycles into the orthodox model will not be easy.
The alternative accounts for credit and ￿nancial cycles ￿ Monetarist, Austrian, Post Keynesian
and Behavioural ￿ differ in their explanations for why they are more endogenous than the
orthodox DSGE model suggests. The degree of endogeneity is related to the initial conditions
that lead to the boom, ranging from portfolio rebalancing and credit shocks (Monetarist); an
inter-temporarily inconsistent monetary policy stance (Austrian); continuous ￿nancial innovation
and macroeconomic stability (Post Keynesian); or irrational responses to precipitating factors
(Behavioural). But all have a large endogenous component and this difference can be traced to
them all having fundamentally different assumptions to the orthodox model.
In our account of the DSGE model we identi￿ed three key assumptions underpinning the result
that a credit and ￿nancial cycle can emerge only in response to technology, monetary or demand
shocks: the ef￿cient markets hypothesis; the rational expectations hypothesis; and optimising
agents. We propose that the main technical challenges facing macroeconomics are likely to be
connected with modifying these assumptions:
A more realistic model of the ￿nancial sector. DSGE models typically contain virtually no
￿nancial sector at all, often with all ￿nancial information deemed relevant being captured by a
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overlook important mechanisms through which portfolio rebalancing may impact asset prices
and the real economy. But in addition to this, by adopting the ef￿cient markets hypothesis as an
assumption, the orthodox model rules out the possibility of truly endogenous credit and ￿nancial
cycles. This seems extreme given recent developments. The possibility that ￿nancial markets
may generate their own shocks, perhaps as a consequence of innovations, perhaps as
consequence of anticipated structural change, needs to be taken more seriously. There is already
a body of literature showing how endogenous credit cycles can arise in response to asymmetric
information problems.30 The challenge now is to develop models such as these and then integrate
them with macroeconomic theory.
Knowledge-based shifts in expectations. That agents form their expectations in a rational way
seems reasonable. But to assume that this means that agents are aware of the economic model
that the economist has built and, further, that the model being built is the correct one seems too
simplistic. Economists have for some time been willing to accept that even if expectations are
formed rationally the information on which they are based is often very imperfect. For example,
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) have assessed the conditions under which an economy with agents
who learn adaptively will converge upon the rational expectations equilibrium. More recently,
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) take a more radical path and show how imperfect knowledge, not
only of the real economy but also of how other agents form their expectations, rules out
pre-determined outcomes in the face of persistent structural change. These and the many other
contributions could be usefully extended and used to help shape policy frameworks that are most
likely to be conducive to economic and ￿nancial stability.31
An important role for institutions. The use of optimising agents in orthodox models neglects
the important role that institutions may play. Modern economic growth theory has recognised the
importance of institutions for economic development and now may be the time for
macroeconomics to move in this direction. The current crisis has shown, for example, how
￿nancial institutions created remuneration policies that may have rewarded risk taking
30See, for example, Martin (2008) and the references therein.
31An interesting recent example in this regard is Christiano et al (2008). They show how integrating credit growth into monetary policy
may result in improved performance when the economy is subjected to shocks which lead agents to form expectations which turn to be
too optimistic.
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externalities associated with some of the ￿nancial innovations that led to an increase in the
supply of credit. Likewise, the strains subsequently placed on the balance sheets of ￿nancial
institutions and the reverberations this has had on the real economy illustrates the importance of
thinking in terms of institutions being part of systems. The optimising agent approach may need
to be signi￿cantly amended or even discarded to capture these effects.
It is only possible to speculate about which of these avenues will prove most fruitful in rectifying
the problems of the orthodox model. But it seems reasonable in the light of recent events to think
that our understanding of credit and ￿nancial cycles must be enriched somehow.
5.2 Macro-Financial Linkages
The experience of the past decade suggests that the links between the real economy and ￿nancial
markets are very complex, often subtle, and can have an important in￿uence on business cycle
dynamics. The absence of stronger growth and rising in￿ation, for example, led policy-makers to
the mistaken conclusion that economic and ￿nancial stability had been achieved. Another
important challenge for macroeconomics must therefore be for these macro-￿nancial linkages to
be better understood. In this section we brie￿y consider three important areas in need of further
research.
First, there is a need for the links between risk premia and macroeconomic stability to be better
understood. The strong desire of policy-makers to deliver macroeconomic stability and of
￿nancial market investors to protect themselves against volatility is prima facie evidence of the
importance of macroeconomic volatility to economic agents and the way they value assets. In
addition, as Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) have argued, ￿nancial market innovations, by
reducing perceptions of risk, may also have eased credit constraints on households and
contributed to the decline in macroeconomic volatility. This may have led to a feedback loop in
which macroeconomic stability and the credit and ￿nancial cycle became mutually reinforcing, at
least for while.33
32For a discussion of remuneration policies in the banking system and the incentives they may have created see House of Commons
(2009).
33See Trichet (2008) for a more general discussion of the links between risk and the macroeconomy.
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credit and ￿nancial cycle might not lead to stronger output growth and/or rising in￿ation. Recent
experience is the clearest example but the cross-country evidence suggests that non-in￿ationary
growth booms that are ultimately unsustainable have been a regular feature of the past twenty
years. The cost channel approach adopted in recent DSGE modelling could be explored further
to see how the cost of external ￿nance may impact on ￿rms’ pricing decisions and thereby mask
underlying in￿ation pressures in a low interest rate environment. The extent to which widening
current account de￿cits may hide in￿ationary pressures also needs to be better understood.
Finally, the asymmetry of the recent credit and ￿nancial cycle ￿ in which the links with output
during the boom appear to have been much weaker than they have so far turned out to be during
the bust ￿ also needs to be accounted for. It could be, for example, that it arises in the leveraging
and de-leveraging processes whereby during the boom phase increasing leverage is
demand-driven and linked predominantly to one source of borrowers but during the bust phase
decreasing leverage is supply driven and so affects all borrowers. This would point to the need
for balance sheet considerations more generally to be given greater prominence.
These linkages ￿ and many others, such as wealth effects on demand ￿ are well known and have
been researched to some extent already. What has changed following the experience of the past
decade is that they have shown to be more important than previously thought. The challenge will
be to identify more precisely the circumstances in which these processes may be suf￿ciently
powerful to produce an unusual business cycle that does not conform with the stylised facts.
5.3 The Limits of Economic Theory
Why was it that the macroeconomic features of the past decade ￿ global ￿nancial imbalances, the
Great Stability, and globalisation ￿ were not recognised as potentially dangerous, or at least not
to a suf￿cient extent? How was it that the conventional wisdom came to view credit and ￿nancial
cycles as a matter of relatively minor importance despite the considerable empirical evidence to
the contrary?
To answer these questions it is necessary to understand how ideas in macroeconomics evolve.
There are many accounts of how particular events have shaped macroeconomic thinking. There
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the classical view of the business cycle and provided the impetus for the Keynesian revolution
that followed. And, as Skidelsky (1992) has shown, this period also demonstrates how for a
theory to become part of orthodox thinking it may not even be suf￿cient for it to provide an
explanation of economic phenomena; it must also have practical policy implications. The
credit-based business cycle model of the Austrian school had been developed in the 1920s and
had been remarkably prescient with its predictions of boom and bust. But it failed to become part
of economic orthodoxy because its policy recommendation of letting the cycle run its course was
unacceptable.
However, some economists view the Keynesian revolution as an exception. Stigler (1960)
￿assigns a minor, and even incidental, role to the contemporary economic environment in the
development of economic theory since it has become a professional discipline￿. He also suggests
that ￿the unending train of ephemeral or local policy questions is of no more signi￿cance for
economic theory than the corresponding types of economic developments￿. If this is true then the
answer to the questions posed above is straightforward: our economic knowledge had not yet
progressed suf￿ciently for the dangers to be recognised.
But even Stigler, writing in 1960, acknowledged that the growing role of empirical research
could increase the sensitivity of theory to events. The verdict of subsequent economists would
seem to suggest that this has, on the whole, been the case. Gordon (1980) argues that in the
post-war period many of the shifts in macroeconomic thinking can be traced to the in￿uence of
particular events. The small role that monetary changes played in explaining demand ￿uctuations
in the 1940s and 1950s reinforced the Keynesian viewpoint of demand management; the
increasing importance of autonomous monetary movements laid the groundwork for greater
emphasis on monetary policy in the 1960s; and the widespread acceptance of monetarism that
followed was the result of an unexpected acceleration in in￿ation in 1968 together with some
noteworthy failures in ￿scal policy. He concludes that ￿Economic ideas rarely lead economic
events but usually follow them￿.
However, there can be little doubt that, from time to time, advances in economic theory still do
lead economic events. For example, while it may be correct to say that the acceleration in
in￿ation in the late 1960s and early 1970s was important to the development of monetarism this
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basis of economic theory turning out to have been more reliable than simple extrapolation from
historical correlations￿. In other words, in this case the theory came ￿rst and the events it
predicted swiftly followed. There are yet other times when the evolution of ideas can be
restrained by technical limitations. For example, Taylor (1988) argues that the most important
factor that hampered macroeconomics from embracing rational expectations more quickly in the
1970s was that it took almost a decade for econometric procedures to be developed to make
rational expectations models operational.
In an appendix we document the changing role of credit in business cycle theory from the 18th
century classical economists to contemporary DSGE models. It tells a complex story of an
empirically important feature of business cycles which has been repeatedly pushed to the fringes
of serious academic research as a consequence of events, advances in theory, and technical
constraints. For example, from the late 1960s to at least the early 1990s, the business cycle
problem with which policy-makers were confronted was not ￿nancial instability but price
instability. The state and direction of academic research re￿ected this with economists largely
content to assume away the problem of credit and ￿nancial cycles using the ef￿cient markets
hypothesis.34 The development of DSGE models needs to be seen in this context. These models
evolved following decades of research attempting to explain, quite literally, the business cycle
characteristics of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.
However, it is also necessary to account for why progress has been so limited in the past decade
when in￿ation has been low and stable and there has been an increasing incidence of ￿nancial
crises. We have already noted how the assumptions of ef￿cient markets, rational expectations and
optimising agents are hard to reconcile with pronounced credit booms. We suspect that, without
there having been a pressing reason for overturning the orthodox model, these assumptions
inadvertently acted as an obstruction to researching credit and ￿nancial cycles. With the bene￿t
of hindsight, some of the heterodox ideas could perhaps have provided building blocks for
making advances in this area. But they were dismissed because the assumptions underlying them
were at odds with those of the prevailing orthodox model.
34Interestingly, this has strong echoes of how economic thought developed in the 1950s and 1960s when, as Gertler (1988) argues, the
signi￿cance of credit for the economy’s ￿nancial structure had been assumed away with the Modigliani-Miller theorem. This only
changed following the development of asymmetric information models of credit markets.
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and ￿nancial cycles that took place over the past three decades highlights a more fundamental
challenge for economists. If the mistakes of the past are to be avoided it may be necessary not
only to amend current macroeconomic ideas in response to recent events but to be more
conscious of this evolutionary tendency of macroeconomic ideas. Theoretical advances in one
area, if they become a matter of ideology, do run the risk of slowing progress in other areas and
possibly at great cost. The status of research that does not incorporate orthodox assumptions may
therefore need to elevated, at least in those areas where the orthodox model cannot be reconciled
with the empirical evidence.
5.4 Broader Policy Challenges
The situation we have described is one where a credit boom developed momentum over a period
of a decade or more, initially focussed on the United States but drawing in a large number of
other countries as well. Given that the implosion of this credit boom has been so damaging for
the global ￿nancial system and for the global economy, an important policy question is how such
a situation might have been prevented. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to make
precise recommendations it is possible to identify broader policy challenges.
The most obvious point to make is that better surveillance of the ￿nancial system is needed ￿
both at the national and international level. Though some institutions did issue warnings ￿ most
notably the Bank for International Settlements35 ￿ there was insuf￿cient awareness of how
vulnerable and unstable the global ￿nancial system was becoming in the mid-2000s. A greater
degree of awareness of this vulnerability would have acted as a catalyst for action at an earlier
stage and, hopefully, a more orderly resolution of the problems in the banking system.
Our analysis suggests that such a system of surveillance should recognise the danger signals
posed by the emergence of large current account de￿cits. As we showed earlier, high rates of
credit growth were associated with large or growing current account de￿cits in many of the
countries concerned.
There are also important lessons here for ￿nancial regulators. As Turner (2009) and others have
35See, for example, White (2006a, 2006b).
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to address the vulnerability of the ￿nancial system as a whole, rather than focussing on speci￿c
institutions. Because the ￿nancial system has become highly globalised, a high degree of
cooperation will be needed between ￿nancial regulators in different countries to operate such a
system ￿ as the recent G20 Summit CommuniquØ recognises. While the current ￿nancial crisis
has given impetus to international policy coordination, it may not be so easy to sustain a high
level of international cooperation when memories of the current crisis begin to fade.
What lessons might be drawn for the operation of monetary policy? As we have argued,
monetary policy can play a role in bringing credit booms to an end. But deploying monetary
policy is much easier when credit growth is also accompanied by strong output growth and
in￿ationary pressures. For a combination of reasons, this was not the case in many countries in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Some have argued that this means that the objectives of monetary
policy should be changed ￿ with a greater focus on ￿leaning against the wind￿ when an asset or
credit bubble is in￿ating by operating a tighter monetary policy than a conventional focus on
price stability ￿ such as an in￿ation target ￿ would imply.
However, we see three problems with this approach. First, it is very dif￿cult to operate because it
is not always clear at what point in the growth of a credit cycle the monetary policy-maker should
intervene. Second, it potentially creates confusion about the objectives of monetary policy by
shifting the focus away from price stability as experienced by the general public towards a more
complex set of objectives. This may undermine the credibility of monetary policy and its ability
to anchor in￿ation expectations at a low and stable level. Third, and most crucially, however, this
￿leaning against the wind￿ approach takes no account of the globalised nature of the ￿nancial
system.
In the recent episode, the global ￿nancial crisis has been driven primarily by developments in the
US mortgage market and within global ￿nancial markets and institutions. It is hard to see that a
different course for monetary policy in other countries ￿ such as the UK, the euro area or Japan ￿
could have made much difference on either front. Within such a globalised ￿nancial system, a
policy which sought to ￿lean against the wind￿ risks having a de￿ationary bias at the national
level ￿ growth is held back in the upswing to head off a national credit bubble and yet the
economy concerned is still at risk from a recession generated by a global ￿nancial crisis. The fact
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effects of the current global recession. Indeed, the export and manufacturing orientation of their
economies means they have been among the hardest hit, in the short term at least.
Could better global coordination of monetary policies have helped in these circumstances? It
could certainly be argued that while monetary policy seemed appropriate for many countries
individually, at the global level it was too loose. The global credit boom was a symptom of this,
as was the in￿ationary pressure which emerged in energy and other commodity markets in the
mid-2000s. But effective coordination is likely to be very dif￿cult to achieve when it is most
needed. It is true that the current recession, along with an increased recognition of global
interdependencies, has led to a renewed interest in policy coordination. But this has been against
a background of strong mutual interest in the common goal of lifting the world economy out of
recession. It would be much harder to achieve an appropriately coordinated monetary response
when the world economy was growing healthily and the sense of common purpose was absent.
Maybe a more appropriate conclusion for monetary policy is the need for greater realism about
what it can and cannot achieve. Monetary policy can deliver price stability over the medium
term. But it cannot also single-handedly maintain the broader stability of the ￿nancial system or
avoid all recessions. Economies experienced cycles and recessions going back to biblical times ￿
long before in￿ation became a problem in the 1970s. Financial instability was an important
driver of cycles before the Second World War. And the recent crisis provides a reminder that the
instabilities of the earlier historical experience can re-emerge.
Another important conclusion for policy is that long expansions eventually come to an end. And
they can be brought to an end by behaviours which are themselves encouraged by the experience
of a long period of growth. The long expansion we saw in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in a
sustained build-up in in￿ationary pressures which was responsible for at least two of the previous
three UK post-war recessions. And we now recognise the ￿nancial excesses which built up in the
recent period of sustained global economic growth ultimately sowed the seeds of the current
recession. In a long period of economic expansion, policy-makers need to be alert to the
imbalances and vulnerabilities which might bring a period of stability to an end. Even in a world
in which in￿ation is generally low and stable recent experience suggests that ￿nancial instability
is another powerful mechanism which can bring a long expansion to an end.
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Economic analysis of the link between credit and activity has a long history.36 Early analysis has
tended to be couched in terms of the quantity theory of money with the distinction between
money and credit not always clear. For example, Hume (1752) argued ￿to endeavour arti￿cially
to increase such a credit, can never be the interest of any trading nation; but must lay them under
disadvantages, by increasing money beyond its natural proportion to labour and commodities,
and thereby heightening their price to the merchant and manufacturer￿. Furthermore, in what
provides a remarkable foretaste of the monetary shocks theory of the business cycle employing
the distinction between the short and long-run Phillips curve Hume writes that ￿it is only in this
interval ... between the acquisition of money and rise of prices ... that the increasing quantity of
gold and silver is favourable to industry￿. Smith (1776) and others made more detailed, but
essentially similar, arguments in later versions of the quantity theory.
It was not until the Bullionist controversy of the 1810s following the suspension of gold
convertibility in English banks in 1797 that the role of bank credit began to be looked at more
seriously again. The equivalence between paper credit (bank checking accounts) and money was
￿rst recognised by Thornton (1802) and this paved the way for a channel by which bank credit
creation could impact activity and prices.37 The same debate re-emerged as the Currency and
Banking School controversy in the 1840s following the Bank of England being given monopoly
over note issue with the conventional view emerging that excessive note issue would lead to
in￿ation and that in consequence there was a need for a gold standard of exchange. However,
these controversies did little to raise the importance of credit itself as an independent driver of the
business cycle relative to that of money. Over a hundred years later, writing about a meeting of
the American Economic Association, Veblen (1904a) was still able to report that there was ￿a
general reluctance to admit that credit is a price-making factor of considerable importance￿.
However, Veblen (1904b) had by that time completed his Theory of Business Enterprise based on
36This appendix draws heavily on Gertler’s (1988) Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview for the period
from the Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics to the mid-1980s. It adds a brief account of pre-20th century thought and
developments in the 1990s and 2000s.
37Hetzel (1987) argues that Thornton was the ￿rst economist to assert that checking accounts formed part of the money stock and that
Thornton ￿successfully integrated into his view of money all media of exchange based on credit creation￿.
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 27 June 2009 40the experience of the US economy in the closing decades of the 19th century in which credit
played a central role. In the Veblen model technological innovations led to businessmen
acquiring credit for investment to the maximum extent. This, along with sectoral demand shifts,
leads to a period of prosperity but, eventually, as prices increase the processes begin to reverse
leading to crisis, depression and de￿ation. A little later, Schumpeter’s (1911) Theory of
Economic Development was published and presented a European perspective on the role of credit
in the business cycle. Technological innovations also play a key role in this theory and the shift
from prosperity and depression and de￿ation operates in a similar fashion to the Veblen model.
Nevertheless, these contributions and some others were insuf￿cient to overturn the classical view
of the business cycle in which credit played a much more limited role.38 There was a time, during
the Great Depression, when this might have changed. A relevant theory which emerged at that
time was Fisher’s (1933) debt-de￿ation hypothesis in which it is argued that ￿in the great booms
and depressions ... the big bad actors are debt disturbances and price level disturbances￿ and
that ￿over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they would have far less
serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money￿. Fisher’s was not so much a
systematic analysis of the relationship between credit and the economy but the particular
circumstances that led to the Great Depression in the context of previous debt-de￿ation episodes
in the United States and elsewhere. However, Fisher’s reputation had been severely damaged by
his optimistic pronouncements made immediately prior to the 1929 stock market crash and so his
ideas were generally ignored at the time.39 It was both too little and too late to halt the Keynesian
revolution which was underway.
The dominance of Keynesian macroeconomics for the next three decades would lead to credit
continuing to be de-emphasised in economics. While Keynes (1936) mentions the ￿state of
credit￿ in The General Theory it merits only one page. The far greater part of the analysis
concerns the demand for money and, in particular, the model of liquidity preference in the
determination of the market rate of interest. Credit was seen as essentially passive, something
that helped to grease the wheels of economic growth, although ￿nancial institutions were given
an important role too.
38The Austrian school had also by the late 1920s developed its distinctive credit-based business cycle model. We examine its model in
more detail in section 3.3. An explanation for why the Austrian school remained outside the mainstream are explained in section 5.3.
39In autumn 1929, Irving Fisher expressed the view that ￿Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau￿. Quoted
in Galbraith (1954).
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(1955) made an early attempt to shift the traditional emphasis away from money and liquidity
preference and redirect it towards the process of ￿nancial intermediation more generally on the
basis that the ￿nancial system had begun to innovate a much broader array of ￿nancial assets. In
such a world what matters for macroeconomic behaviour is not money, or even bank credit, but
overall ￿nancial capacity to obtain loanable funds. Gurley and Shaw argued that ￿The Keynesian
model is inappropriate to ￿nancial aspects of growth analysis for two reasons. First, it does not
permit direct debt to accumulate and affect ￿nancial determinants of spending. Second, it admits
of only two kinds of ￿nancial asset, money and bonds, on the assumption that the stock though
not the location of bonds is ￿xed. The model is not hospitable to the ￿nancial intermediaries
whose development in recent decades has diversi￿ed indirect ￿nance and marked commercial
banking as a relatively declining industry￿.
Although efforts were made to incorporate ￿nancial sectors in macroeconomic models, such as
Brainard and Tobin’s (1963) model which considers the impact of subjecting non-bank
intermediaries to monetary controls, the attempt to shift the focus away from money and towards
credit then stalled. There are perhaps two reasons for this. The ￿rst was the results of empirical
work, especially following Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) extensive examination of the links
between money and activity in the United States over a period of nearly a century, including
during the Great Depression, and the shift towards monetarism that it helped to engender.
Furthermore, additional empirical work by Sims (1972) and others using Vector Auto-Regression
techniques appeared to con￿rm the monetarist argument by showing that lags of the money
supply were helpful in forecasting output. The debate among mainstream economists therefore
focused not on the merits of money versus credit but whether money was exogenous or
endogenous.
The second reason was developments in the methods of macroeconomic analysis. In ￿nance
theory, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem proved rigorously, under certain assumptions,
the irrelevance of ￿nancial structure for the real economy. With the credit-based models of the
time being predicated on very complicated processes they were simply not capable of being
presented in the same way. In economic theory, the shift towards the use of representative agent
models posed huge challenges to those supporting the credit view. It was, and remains,
technically challenging to aggregate models using heterogeneous agents, which is a pre-requisite
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Notwithstanding the technical challenges posed by the representative agent approach, further
empirical work and advances in microeconomic theory helped to revive interest in the role of
credit in the early 1980s. Empirical work by Sims (1980) and Friedman (1980, 1982)
respectively cast doubt on the earlier work that showed that money was able to forecast output
and suggested that the relationship between debt and output was more stable than the relationship
between money and output. An in￿uential piece of work at this time was that of Bernanke (1983)
who turned to the familiar problem of explaining the Great Depression, arguing that monetary
forces were a ￿quantitatively insuf￿cient￿ explanation. Instead he emphasised non-monetary
factors, in particular the choking off of ￿ows of credit to households and ￿rms from the whole of
the ￿nancial sector.40 In parallel, models of information problems in ￿nancial markets began to
emerge. Building on Akerlof’s (1970) model of the ￿market for lemons￿, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981, 1984) showed how informational asymmetries could lead to credit rationing and make it
more dif￿cult for ￿rms to raise equity capital by issuing more shares. Over time, numerous other
microeconomic models of ￿nancial intermediation have been developed.41
With the informational asymmetries in credit markets providing micro-foundations it was
possible by the mid-1980s to move beyond the Modigliani-Miller theorem and to re-launch the
credit view within the macro-economic mainstream. The initial response was simply to revive
credit in traditional macroeconomic models, such as in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and
Brunner and Meltzer (1988). Although these early models could incorporate rational
expectations they did not have micro-foundations of the sort employed in New Classical and Real
Business Cycle models which had been developed over the previous decade in response to the
failure of Keynesian economic models in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in these models,
nominal rigidities were assumed, but not derived from ￿rst principles, and as a consequence
these models were not robust to the Lucas critique.
The second response was to adopt the New Classical and Real Business Cycle approach,
including many of their assumptions such as the ef￿cient markets hypothesis, rational
40For a recent empirical analysis of the role of credit in the Great Depression which employs time series analysis of macroeconomic
aggregates see Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003).
41See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a review of the literature on the role of credit frictions in the transmission of monetary policy.
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thinking over the past two decades. However, progress was hampered by the dif￿culty of
incorporating a credit channel in models using representative agents. An important treatment that
contributed to this changing was the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) in which durable
assets such as land, buildings and machinery serve as collateral for bank loans as a way of
overcoming information asymmetries. They ￿nd that ￿The dynamic interaction between credit
limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of
shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors￿. Building upon this, the ‘￿nancial
accelerator’ model developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) incorporated credit
market frictions into a Dynamic New Keynesian model for the ￿rst time by introducing
heterogenous ￿rms . In this sticky price model, access to credit for the purposes of investment
depends on the net worth, or collateral, of ￿rms. It is found that ￿the ￿nancial sector has a
signi￿cant in￿uence on business cycle dynamics￿.
Over the past decade, there have been numerous attempts to include within standard DSGE
models additional mechanisms by which credit frictions impact on demand (e.g., effects on
consumption as well as investment). Taken together, they show how the ￿nancial accelerator
could potentially be a very signi￿cant propagation mechanism. Nevertheless, the re-introduction
of credit into business cycle theory that has taken place over the past decade or so is an
incremental step rather than a revolution in economic thought. The ￿nancial accelerator, which
results in credit playing some role within this model of the business cycle, is an extension of the
principle of building models with rigorous micro-foundations in which the economy ￿uctuates in
response to the propagation of exogenous real and monetary shocks which are then re￿ected in
credit and asset prices. The result is a pseudo-endogenous model of credit but not one that allows
for pronounced endogenous credit and ￿nancial cycles to be a driver of the business cycle.
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Table 1 –  Bank lending booms, 1970-2006
Start End Duration chg, pp chg, % Year Excess, %
World 1971 1973 2 5 10 1972 3
UK 1971 1974 3 24 69 1972 20
US 1972 1974 2 3 6 1973 4
Netherlands 1973 1980 7 25 63 1978 10
India 1975 1979 4 6 40 1976 12
South Africa 1981 1985 4 7 15 1984 8
UK 1981 1989 8 61 115 1984 14
Switzerland 1982 1984 2 7 6 1982 9
Norway 1982 1988 6 30 95 1986 25
Finland 1982 1989 7 31 59 1988 9
Denmark 1983 1987 4 44 29 1986 22
Emerging 1984 1987 3 10 22 1986 8
China 1984 1987 3 17 29 1986 12
World 1984 1989 5 13 21 1989 4
World ex US 1984 1989 5 17 27 1989 5
Australia 1984 1990 6 31 105 1989 18
Mexico 1984 1994 10 25 174 1992 34
US 1985 1987 2 2 3 1986 4
Brazil 1986 1989 3 75 124 1987 30
New Zealand 1986 1989 3 10 16 1987 6
Japan 1986 1989 3 18 19 1987 7
Sweden 1986 1990 4 34 37 1988 14
Belgium 1987 1991 4 20 33 1989 15
France 1987 1991 4 14 17 1990 6
Spain 1988 1991 3 4 6 1989 10
Austria 1989 1991 2 4 4 1990 4
Thailand 1989 1995 6 68 94 1994 10
Portugal 1991 2001 10 83 147 1992 19
Argentina 1993 1999 6 6 34 1994 16
Germany 1993 1998 5 20 20 1998 4
Uruguay 1994 2002 8 54 228 1998 50
Ireland 1995 2000 5 35 50 1995 30
Malaysia 1995 1998 3 34 27 1997 16
Singapore 1995 1998 3 20 22 1998 9
Chile 1995 2000 5 16 33 1996 15
Netherlands 1996 2000 4 35 35 1998 7
China 1997 2000 3 18 20 1998 7
World 1997 2000 3 6 7 1998 3
Advanced 1997 2000 3 6 8 1998 3
Korea 1997 2002 5 30 48 1999 9
Sweden 1997 2003 6 17 20 2000 13
World ex Japan, Germany 1998 2003 5 9 13 2000 4
Italy 1999 2001 2 7 10 1999 13
Statistics
World
Mean - - 4 23 46 - 13
Median - - 4 18 27 - 10
Standard deviation - - 2 20 50 - 10
Advanced
Mean - - 4 24 42 - 12
Median - - 4 20 29 - 10
Standard deviation - - 2 19 40 - 7
Emerging
Mean - - 5 29 68 - 18
Median - - 4 20 34 - 12
Standard deviation - - 2 23 67 - 13
Credit ratio: start-to-end Peak Period (years)
   
 
Table 2 – Bank lending booms, 2007 
IMF
Weight Start Duration chg, pp chg, % Year Excess, %
W o r l d 7 9 . 9 ------
W o r l d  e x  U S 5 6 . 4 ------
World ex Japan, Germany 67.1 2005 3 9 11 2007 4
Advanced 58.6 2005 3 7 7 2006 3
US 23.6 1995 13 15 32 2000 6
J a p a n 7 . 7 ------
G e r m a n y 5 . 2 ------
France 3.7 2002 5 20 23 2007 7
UK 3.6 2003 4 45 31 2007 7
I t a l y 3 . 4 ------
Spain 2.2 1997 11 104 133 2006 12
Canada 2.1 - - - - - -
A u s t r a l i a 1 . 2 ------
N e t h e r l a n d s 1 . 1 ------
B e l g i u m 0 . 7 ------
Greece 0.6 1996 12 61 196 2001 22
A u s t r i a 0 . 6 ------
Sweden 0.6 2005 3 15 14 2007 6
Switzerland 0.5 2005 3 12 7 2007 5
Portugal 0.4 - - - - - -
N o r w a y 0 . 4 ------
Denmark 0.4 1997 11 81 67 1998 15
Finland 0.3 2000 8 28 54 2003 18
Ireland 0.3 2004 4 64 47 2005 11
New Zealand 0.2 2005 3 17 13 2006 5
Emerging 21.4 ------
C h i n a 7 . 2 ------
India 3.7 1998 10 24 98 2000 12
Brazil 3.0 2000 8 11 36 2007 39
Mexico 2.3 2005 3 4 27 2006 27
K o r e a 1 . 8 ------
A r g e n t i n a 0 . 8 ------
T h a i l a n d 0 . 7 ------
South Africa 0.7 1995 13 36 76 1998 8
M a l a y s i a 0 . 5 ------
C h i l e 0 . 3 ------
Singapore 0.3 - - - - - -
U r u g u a y 0 . 1 ------
Statistics
World
Mean 2001 7 36 57 2004 13
Median 2002 8 24 36 2006 11
Standard deviation - 4 29 52 - 10
Advanced
Mean 2001 7 42 56 2004 10
Median 2002 5 28 32 2006 7
Standard deviation - 4 32 58 - 6
Emerging
Mean 2000 9 19 59 2003 22
Median 1999 9 17 56 2003 20
Standard deviation - 4 14 33 - 14
Peak Period (years) Credit ratio: start-to-2007
 
   
 
Table 3 – US financial liabilities 
2007, % of GDP (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Households Non-financial Private General Total Financial Total
and NPISH Corporates Non-Financial Government Non-financial Corporations
=(A)+(B) =(C)+(D) =(E)+(F)
(1) Deposits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 66.9 67.1
(2) Loans 100.8 48.4 149.3 0.0 149.3 33.6 182.9
(3) Banking system = (1)+(2) 100.8 48.4 149.3 0.2 149.5 100.5 250.0
(4) Bonds 1.8 28.0 29.8 49.0 78.9 106.9 185.8
(5) Equity 0.0 177.8 177.8 0.0 177.8 139.2 317.0
(6) Capital markets =(4)+(5) 1.8 205.8 207.6 49.0 256.7 246.1 502.8
(7) Insurance reserves 0.2 0.3 0.5 8.1 8.6 113.5 122.1
(8) Other accounts payable 1.5 40.8 42.3 5.7 48.0 15.0 63.0
(9) Total =(3)+(6)+(7)+(8) 104.3 295.4 399.7 63.1 462.8 475.1 937.9
(10) Memo: Credit = (2)+(4) 102.7 76.5 179.1 49.0 228.2 140.5 368.7  
 
Table 4 – US financial liabilities 
2007, % of total (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Households Non-financial Private General Total Financial Total
and NPISH Corporates Non-Financial Government Non-financial Corporations
=(A)+(B) =(C)+(D) =(E)+(F)
(1) Deposits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.2
(2) Loans 10.8 5.2 15.9 0.0 15.9 3.6 19.5
(3) Banking system = (1)+(2) 10.8 5.2 15.9 0.0 15.9 10.7 26.7
(4) Bonds 0.2 3.0 3.2 5.2 8.4 11.4 19.8
(5) Equity 0.0 19.0 19.0 0.0 19.0 14.8 33.8
(6) Capital markets =(4)+(5) 0.2 21.9 22.1 5.2 27.4 26.2 53.6
(7) Insurance reserves 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.9 12.1 13.0
(8) Other accounts payable 0.2 4.4 4.5 0.6 5.1 1.6 6.7
(9) Total =(3)+(6)+(7)+(8) 11.1 31.5 42.6 6.7 49.3 50.7 100.0
(10) Memo: Credit = (2)+(4) 10.9 8.2 19.1 5.2 24.3 15.0 39.3  
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Chart 7: Non-financial private sector credit* 
% of GDP 
Table 5: Non-financial private sector credit 











1950 1958 1966 1974 1982 1990 1998 2006
Non-financial firms Households
* Heavy lines are US data; light lines are OECD ex-US data
 
pp % pp %
US 29 32 9 11
Japan -9 -11 -26 -18
Germany -9 -12 -1 -6
UK 31 36 34 36
F r a n c e 1 23 11 81 3
OECD 17 23 7 6
OECD ex US 10 15 5 4
OECD ex US/Jap/Ger 21 40 18 15
OECD ex Jap/Ger 25 35 14 15
Households Firms
 
Chart 8: OECD real interest rates 
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Table 6: Asset prices and imbalances 
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1995 81 92 98 0.1
1996 86 91 97 0.0
1997 108 92 97 0.1
1998 117 94 100 -0.1
1999 141 97 100 -0.7
2000 100 100 100 -1.3
2001 91 103 101 -1.1
2002 59 108 101 -1.1
2003 91 112 100 -1.1
2004 98 117 100 -1.0
2005 111 123 99 -1.4
2006 122 127 98 -1.6
2007 113 129 97 -1.4
2008 63 125 97 -1.5
Chart 9: GDP deflator 
% y-o-y 
Chart 10: Credit ratios and inflation 
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Chart 11: Real GDP 
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Chart 12: Credit ratios and real GDP 
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Bubble size is proportional to GDP




































Chart 13: OECD CPI inflation 
% y-o-y 
Chart 14: GDP growth in the late 1980s and 1990s




















OECD OECD excluding Japan
Chart 15: Credit ratios and real domestic demand
Between 1995-97 and 2005-07 
Chart 16: Credit ratios and current accounts 
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